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Ever since the organizations of integration came into being political 
literature and so also public opinion has begun to be keenly interested 
in the goal towards economic integration is likely to be heading in the 
future. May political intertwining be expected reasonably after the comp­
letion of economic intertwining ? Is an automatic transition imaginable in a 
certain sense between the two types of integration ? Will some sort of a 
federation take shape in the western half of the European Continent ?
It is not by mere chance that these questions have emerged. Several 
economists and politicians expected the resolution of the gravest contra­
dictions of the capitalist system from a European integration already in 
the years before the outbreak of the Second World War. Lord Keynes 
and his followers have formulated the idea of the unification of the segre­
gated national markets. From this unification they expected the elimina­
tion of world economic crises. On the other hand Covdenhove-Kalergi 
and his devotees championed the cause of a federal Europe, hoping the 
forestall by this armed conflicts between the national States. After the 
Second World War only economic integration had a fair chance. Still 
political intertwining was not struck off the agenda. All political leaders 
of these years thought that the goal was the creation of a United Europe. 
Robert Schuman, one of the most prominent leaders of the movement of 
integration, e.g. in an article written in 1953 tried to make it clear that 
after the World War logically first the political unification of Western 
Europe ought to have taken place. Instead, however, it appeared to be 
more reasonable to create a sectoral integration, like the European Coal 
and Steel Community. Within the framework of such an organization the 
intertwining of steel and coal production would anyhow normally bring 
about the integration of other sectors of economy, and eventually also the 
birth of the political community.1 Although the situation has undergone 
changes in many respects since 1953, doctrines developed on these lines 
still turn up, even if not in France. E.g. Willy Brandt, while still chan­
cellor, made the following statement once he was questioned: “When I 
appear as the spokesman of the Europe of realities, this does not mean,
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as if I had lost sight of the ultimate political goal. This goal is the political 
community, and nothing else. And this, without depriving the national 
identities of their contents, presupposes the creation of a justly organized 
European government, which would make decisions in the field of joint 
politics and would be under parliamentary control.2
Substantially this is the position taken by several bourgeois repre­
sentatives of the functionalist theory of integration. E.g. Ernst Haas 
believes that amongothers the process of integration may be described by 
what is called the “spill over" effect/' Haas is convinced that an initial 
step towards partial integration would trigger off a process advancing 
and expanding like a snowball, which would then continue to develop with 
an automatism governed by laws of its own.4 The goal towards which this 
process is tending is the creation of an “economic union” and a corres­
ponding “political union” still undefined in their outlines. Consequently 
economic integration will sooner or later change over to political integ­
ration .
Even in Hungary there are authors professing similar opinions. Ac­
cording to Istvan Gyulai e.g. “ . . . economic integration is inevitably 
followed by a tendency towards political integration, which will prevail
by relying on the former.“5 Tibor Paldnkai writes that “ ........from the
formal side, integration, as the process of development of definite units, 
will at a given point of necessity throw out the idea of political integra­
tion . . .. Complete economic union, i.e. the complete economic integration 
will, like before so also in the future, in all certainty presuppose the politi­
cal union.” Somewhat later, however, he appears to be calling into doubt 
the primacy of economy in this sense. Referring to the age of the termina­
tion of feudal disintegration he remarks that “ . . . the process of integra­
tion to national economies indispensably presupposed the political integ­
ration, the formation of the national State.“"
Other authors entertain even stronger doubts as to the functionalist 
theory. E.g. Imre Vajda states that “although the method of production, 
the forces of production and the social relations determine the political 
institutions, as indicated by historical experience, economic interest is 
after all not a State-creating force . . . .  Economic union is not a stepping- 
stone on the path leading to [political] integration, it is merely a desir­
able consequence of it.“7 According to Mihâly Simai “the role of the politi­
cal framework, the significance of the State, are still great enough that 
the changes likely to take place, the possible shifts in politics and econo­
mics in the remaining decades of the second half of the 20th century, will 
not influence the survival of the States and the political-organizational 
basic units of world economy.”8 Lindberg, in a work written in conjunction 
with Scheingold, calls forth attention to the circumstance that the institu­
tion of the national State has gathered strength exactly at the effect of 
integration in the latter decade, so that chances of the formation of a 
political union are poor.9 According to Heinz Wagner “today it appears 
that the belief as if the response to the political economic challenge could 
again be discovered in the foundation of another, yet greater State, and
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that integration now become essential could be achieved only within the 
framework of a greater State, was wrong. . . . If the ‘State’ was the only 
imaginable political organizational form of modern times, then these 
times are on the decline.”10
Actually we have sparse knowledge only of the processes passing 
off in the national States and the nature of the objective and subjective 
forces preserving the institution of the national State. This may perhaps 
account for the failure of any attempt at the formation of a theoretically 
properly founded Marxist position to this day. It is far from the present 
author to impress the reader as if he were capable of answering this prob­
lem, in particular in a complex form. All tee should like to undertake here is 
to align a fete further arguments to make clear, ivhy economic integration 
cannot spill over automatically into political integration. Hence it is not oui- 
intention to demonstrate that a similar process can take place in no 
circumstances: in fact certain steps have already been taken to intensify 
the cooperation of the member States in foreign politics. These steps 
cannot, however, be considered steps towards integration. Therefore all 
we want to state is that this process must not of necessity head towards 
such a goal.
Before, however, proceeding to a detailed exposition of our arguments 
we would remind that the segregation of “economic” and “political” integ­
ration as oulined earlier, is too rigid and may be a]it to lead to erroneous 
conclusions.
Namely as has already been made clear earlier, in general by the 
notion of “economic” integration macro-integration — established on the 
international plane — should be understood rather than micro-integration, 
i.e. integration at enterprisal level. The two mutually presuppose each 
other: at a given point productive integration strikes on the boundaries 
of macroeconomics, and cannot advance beyond this point without macro- 
integration. Macro-integration cannot, however, be considered exclusively 
an economic process. This type of integration is “fundamentally a polit­
ical question and also one of the sovereign power.”11 Under capitalist con­
ditions macroeconomic integration stands for the creation of a system 
of political institutions which on the one side provides appropriate frame­
works and conditions for the productive integration of private capital, 
and on the other, to a significant measure stimulates this capital. This 
State system of institutions manifests itself on the one side in the direct 
formation of definite, international, joint economic mechanisms (e.g. 
customs unions), and on the other, in the creation of international organi­
zations capable of continually deciding on the introduction of yet further 
economic mechanisms. Decisions on the creation of such a system of 
institutions as well as the subsequent decisions to be made by the inter­
national organizations so created constitute internationally concerted 
decisions of economic policy. These decisions do, however, by far not 
stand in all circumstances for the establishment of an economic, i.e. 
productive or micro-integration in the strict meaning of the term. Con­
sequently what in everyday parlance has received the designation of
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“economic ’ integration is in a large number of instances but the process of 
institutionalized decisions of international economic policy directed to the 
creation of joint mechanisms of the member Stales.
Economic policy for its part is but part and parcel of the general, of 
necessity state, policy. W ith the growth and development of society this 
policy understood in a wide sense tends to differentiate, its particular 
branches (home, foreign or social policy) become relatively segregated 
from one another. This does not, however, mean as if there were no interre­
lations among the particular branches, or with “politics” as a whole. The 
decision of those responsible for the economic policy of the country will, 
dependent on the concrete subject of the decision, have repercussions on 
all other branches of “politics” and vice versa. Any decision in the domain 
of economic policy will be associated, closely or less closely, with activ­
ities for the acquisition and retention of the sovereign power, or the exer­
cise of this sovereign power, and through this, with the struggle of the 
classes of society with one another (or within the classes, the struggle of 
strata and groups with one another). Consequently a decision relating to 
macroeconomic integration irili at the same time become a political decision, 
irrespective of whether or not this epithet has been assigned to it. There­
fore in the meaning of the term as given above, the “purest” economic 
integration will in the last resort become a political integration, with all 
its consequences.
In these circumstances is there a sense at all in the distinction bet­
ween “economic” and “political" integration ? In a certain respect there 
is one. The institutionalized joint decisions of the member States of the 
integrating region may namely dependent on the subject-matter to 
which they relate have a variety of effects. There are e.g. decisions dir­
ectly associated with the activity for the acquisition and retention of the 
sovereign power, or decisions which may substantially influence the power 
position of certain classes, strata or groups of society. There are yet other 
decisions which have repercussions in this sense in an indirect manner 
only. Furthermore the creation of certain institutions, or decisions made 
by them, may affect the very elements of the essence of the national 
States, even to a point where these institutions or their decisions bring about 
the disintegration of these national States and create a new. centralized 
power system above the States. Other decisions will at the same time and 
in the last resort leave the fundamental traits of the present structure of 
international relations unchanged. In this sense, we believe, a realistic 
line may be drawn between the two sectoral groups of State politics, viz. 
between the sectors primarily of economic policy, and those primarily of 
power politics.
Hence the present study will on this understanding examine whether 
or not decisions of international integration affecting the particular 
economic sectors will bv themselves elicit the need for decisions of power 
politics, or bring about the resolution of the national States as macro­
frameworks in a larg« unit. Therefore when in the following there will be
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talk of “political” integration, we shall have in mind only a sector of 
politics, viz. power politics, in the general acceptation of the term:
The hypothesis as if integration of economic policy would infallibly 
entail the integration of power politics, at the first sight appears to be 
inspired by Marxism: economy is the determining factor, the concrete 
forms and framework of the superstructure (this time the State or inter­
state  system) are defined by economy. The situation is, however, far from 
being so simple and clear-cut. First, it should be remembered that “eco­
nomy” is a determining factor on considerations not only of macro-politics, 
but also of macro-economics. Therefore there can be no talk of the macro- 
economic framework as such as solely defines the macro-political frame­
work. Tn fact the fo mer, too. are themselves determined by a third factor, 
viz. by economy. Therefore from the circumstance that the macro- 
economic framework actually coincides with the geographical frontiers of 
the Nine, does not of necessity follow that thise has to become the new 
macro-political framework absolutely. Still let us proceed further. If eco­
nomy. in the present instance the macro-integration, were considered the 
sole determining factor, then the actual outlines of the Western European 
macro-economic frontiers would appear as being somewhat nonsensical. 
Namely as T. Palânkai states “micro-integration has produced a surf of all- 
Western-European, moreover in certain fields, of Atlantic dimensions, 
while macro-integration has remained restricted to a regional organization, 
to the European Economic Community.” Quoting yet another charac­
teristic example he. remarks that the United States of America has integrated 
roughly sixty per cent of the productive capacity of Canada with her 
own economy, and yet no form of macro-integration whatever has come 
into being between the two States.12 There is an example the other way 
round: the macro-politieally integrated China or India could hardly 
boast of a micro-economic integration at this moment. Consequently the 
frontiers of micro- and macro-integration do not coincide of necessity at all, 
therefore there can hardly lie talk of mechanical determinedness. Here the 
well-known statement of Engels may be quoted: “it is not true that the 
economic situation is the cause, the sole active effect, whereas every­
thing else is but a passive effect.”13 Obviously the formation of the fron­
tiers in the one way or the other depends on a number of factors, such as 
nationalism, foreign political constellations, historical traditions, etc. It 
is obvious further that these factors are in interrelations of extreme com­
plexity with one another and of them economy is the determining factor 
in the last resort only. Therefore the statement that the expansion of the 
macro-economic framework will as a rule bring about the expansion of 
the macro-political framework can be made with extreme caution only.
This is. however, but a single approach only to the problem. We shall 
now tackle the problem from anot her, and for that matter more important 
side, namely from the side of the State and the functions of the State. 
Whenever there is talk of the resolution of the national State in a larger 
unit, many are inclined to ignore that State economic policy, or State 
“interference” in economic life, is but one, and by no means essential,
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function of the State. There is hardly need for recapitulating for the reader 
all relevant fundamental statements of Marxism. Therefore reference 
will only be made to the following.
As Engels has demonstrated, the State has come into being as the 
product of the division of labour, and of the birth of private property 
and the classes of society.11 The maintenance of the economic power of 
the ruling class namely became necessary. This maintenance of the econo­
mic power consisted above ail in the safeguard of the property and dis­
tribution relations underlying the economic power. The institution of 
this safeguard is “the territorially segregated public power-’, the State 
disposing of a central power-enforcement machinery. Hence the primary 
function of the State is the preservation of the political power of the 
economically predominant class. In association with this function though, 
yet somewhat relatively segregated from it, as the consequence of the 
development of the forces of production another function of the State, 
namely the guarantee of the “external conditions of production’’ lias 
begun to extend to yet wider territories. This trend has manifested itself 
in the first place in the intensification of the State economic policy. Not­
withstanding their mutual interrelation for the purpose of the present 
discussion the two functions fundamentally differ from each other. In the 
course of historical development namely the primary, essential function 
of the State has preserved its specifically national character, whereas the 
other function could increasingly be performed only within the framework 
of international cooperation. İ t has been within the framework of this 
cooperation that it has come to the creation of a macro-economic integra­
tion. Even if the universality of the production relations has put an end 
to the earlier segregation of the non-commodity producing states, if in 
certain geographical regions the development of the international division 
of labour lias brought about the integration of earlier macro-economic 
units into large units, the fundamental function of the State could ne­
vertheless preserve its national character.
Economy has with success challenged the economic policy possessing 
a national market and a national rationality only. At the same time, 
however, no political factor has yet challenged in any form the. organization 
of class rule mithin the framework of the national State. Tn the present 
phase class struggle still takes place within the national State. The wor­
king class has though taken initial steps towards some sort of an interna­
tional cooperation in the area in process of integration. As is known 
recently the Western European communist and working class parties 
have taken action for the coordination of their efforts and for launching 
a joint campaign against the monopolies. This is, however, by far not the 
sign of the integration of its forces by the working class. Consequently the 
capitalist class does not for the time being take into consideration the 
integration of its power-enforcement organizations.
As regards economy, it was the interest of capital, both national and 
international, to bring about uniform and well-arranged market mechanisms
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in a territory of optimal area, mechanisms namely which would not ob­
struct the f  ree flow of the factors of production. Capital, however, had not 
to have recourse to drastic means for the enforcement of its interests. All 
it had to do was to convince the political machinery of the justness of 
its ends. The capitalist State proved to be elastic enough: it gave the 
green light to the flow of the factors of production and in a number of fields 
abandoned the enforcement of irrational decisions made autonomous­
ly in economic policy. I t  was perhaps due to this elasticity that this 
State could preserve its life for another historical period. Tn these cir­
cumstances namely national or international capital would have taken 
action against the institution of a national State on the plane of power 
politics only, when this State would put up resistance to the objective 
coercive power arising from the development of the forces of production 
and attempt to survive not only as a macro-political, but also as a macro- 
economic unit. Even in this case, however, there would have remained a 
chance for the capitalist class to stand up against the bureaucratic 
machinery of the State rather than against the national State itself. It 
is namely not absolutely the national State which throws obstacles in the 
way of the development of integration. There may be cases when only 
public administration will remain conservative. In this case it is sufficient 
to overthrow the machinery or the leadership rather than to tamper 
with the macro-political basic unit.
A similar statement suggests itself also in the international field. In a 
large number of States in close economic relations to one another and 
mature for integration, the capitalist classes defined their interests in a 
uniform manner and made the respective machineries of public adminis­
tration recognize these interests. The sphere of States intent to take part in 
the integration was large enough to perevent conflicts of a graver nature 
from arising between the States left in the dark and the others in a process 
of integration. Consequently the institution of the national State was not 
jeopardized from the international side either: for the solution of the 
continually proliferating market problems this time the less dangerous 
and by far more efficacious peaceful methods offered themselves.
In general the statement may be made that the integration of eco­
nomic policy is but the process of the partial transition of the capitalist 
national Stale into its own antihesis. In the same way, however, as the 
ever increasing economic “interference” of the capitalist State has not 
put an end to private property, although this interference means the 
partial change-over of private property into its own antithesis, so integra­
tion will not absolutely bring about the end of the national State. More­
over in the.same way as the one process gives strength to the social system 
relying on private property, the other process may tend to reinforce the 
institution of the national State. The State may namely continue to 
perform its functions of a determining character, viz. the defence of class 
rule and the guarantee of the “external conditions of production.” The 
one may be guaranteed by the maintenance and improvement of the 
institutions of the sovereign power of the national State, the other by the
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creation of organizations and mechanisms of international integration 
and the participation in these.
What has been set forth so far may perhaps impress as if in the last 
resort the integration of power politics depended on whether or not, and 
to what extent, the new international bureaucracy is willing to make its 
decisions in a manner suiting the collective interests of the capitalist 
class. If on this understanding the mechanism suffered a defeat, “spill 
over” and “spill back” would become of ecpial occurrence in the process 
of integration. It might happen namely that for the removal of the possible 
emerging grave contradictions the political leadership of the member 
States chose the path of “flight forward” and took steps towards the 
integration of power politics. (TntheCommon Market motions urging the 
transformation of the Community into a “supranational” organization 
generally come forward when the decision-making mechanisms keeps on 
stalling.) At the same time it might also happen that political leadership 
took the opposite course. In this case the earlier policy of economic autar­
chy or protectionism would be apt to return.
It is unlikely, however, that the opposition of the international 
bureaucracy, or its deviating ideas, would bring about the miscarriage of 
decision making in the integration. Namely in the bureaucracy of the in­
tegration in general the representatives of the same political groupings 
are active as hold the power in their own States. This guarantees that 
in the long run the bureaucracy of the integration cannot pursue a policy 
conflicting with the interests of the capitalist class. To this we have to add 
that the bureaucracy only prepares and enforces the essential decisions, 
but never makes them. Decision-making is vested in the organ of 
the representatives of the governments. For the possible failures there­
fore in the first place the national bureaucracies are responsible. (To this 
problem we shall revert.)
By the side of the hypothesis of the spill-over of “economic” integ­
ration into “political" integration as a common everyday argument usually 
the analogy of the birth of national States is brought forward. Some of the 
authors dealing with the theory of integration set out from the thesis that 
the decay of feudalism and the birth of the national State passed off in 
close interrelation with the integration to national economy; the one 
process presupposed the other. From this fact the conclusion has been 
drawn that in the present regional integrations very much the same deve­
lopment may be expected: history repeats itself.
The partisans of this doctrine are, however, oblivious of an extremely 
significant difference. The process namely coincided historically with one 
of the basic forms of the class struggle: the struggle of the feudal class and 
the bourgeoisie for the political power. At the outset of the process, when 
the objective demand for integration came to the fore, another class vas the 
holder of povcr and at the same time the creation of an integrated national 
market vas the interest of yet another class. The feudal ruling class laid no 
claims to integration, moreover it had the feeling, and not without good 
reasons, as if its very existence were endangered by the creation of the
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united national State. I t  was prepared to defend its vital interests, i.e. 
the maintenance of feudal désintégration, with all available means. The 
bourgeoisie gaining strength had no other choice but to rise against feuda­
lism in alliance with the feudal ruler, or without this alliance, on the plane 
of political power. The bourgeoisie had to create the strong, lasting centra­
lized sovereign power, else it could not hope the establishment of an 
integrated national market.
The formula of the process of integration passing off today is an 
altogether different one. At present the interests of the class holding the 
po litica l power are attached to integration. As has already been made clear 
the capitalist class will not have to stand up therefore against the institu­
tion of the national State. I t will suffice to come to a settlement within its 
own class, or with the national public administration.
The following argument against the integration of power politics 
relies on the statement of /. Vajda. In his opinion it is not a criterion of 
integration that it should take place in all sectors. All that is needed “is 
the rise of the production and development and of the associated research 
work of such industries to an international level, and also their program­
ming, as, for their technical standards, manifold vertically, the size of 
their investments and the rapid rhythm of renewal substantially going 
beyond the average, cannot be developed to an optimal size without up­
setting the intrinsic equilibrium of the national economy. . . . Therefore 
there is no need for total integration: development calls for selective integ­
ration.”15 Hence the integration e.g. of the aircraft or computer industry 
has become indispensable, whereas the integration of certain branches of 
the foodstuff industry would have directly harmful effects. From this 
fact an extremely significant conclusion may be drawn, viz. vat even the 
economic and monetary union would for practical purposes mean a complete, 
hundred per cent integration. Consequently integration would leave certain 
fields or sectors of national economy intact, or at least influence them 
indirectly only, through the other integrated fields or sectors. In many 
respects therefore social production will continue to organize itself within 
the earlier, national framework and the economic-institutional forms 
will also develop accordingly. Certain national machineries of management 
and their competences will remain unchanged and in the fields in ques­
tion neither organizational integration, nor that of the mechanism will 
take place. Consequently even if we accepted the thesis that integrated 
production calls for integrated forms of power politics, we should have to 
admit that several sectors of economy have no effects whatever on the 
superstructure or its integration. In this case there can therefore be no 
talk of a “spill over” effect.
Yet let us go further. Actually the situation is one where not only 
the branches of economic management do not insist on regional guidance 
in whose field integration has not taken place. Obviously e.g. the orga­
nization of the administration of justice does not insist on being raised to 
a regional level either merely because in certain branches of economy 
integration has taken place. In the same way and as far as known no
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demand for integration has come forward for the integration of certain 
non-economic fields of management. Merely by way of example we would 
refer to public health, the prosecution of crime, primary and secondary 
education, town planning the operation of the means of mass communica­
tion and so on. As regards the appearance of military integration, this in 
general is not associated with economic integration and is expressly the 
function of the international political constellation. It is by no means 
accidental that as regards the capitalist countries the geographical 
frontiers of the two kinds of integration do not coincide.
All that has been set forth merely indicates that at a (jive» point the 
process of the, assignment of the rights of decision-making to central agencies 
tends to slacken and enter a phase of stagnation: the jurisdiction of (he orga­
nization, at least in this relation, does not expand any further. T.e. no cent- 
tra! institution comes into being which would embrace all fields of human 
activity and cooperation. For that matter this is not even possible. Con­
sequently the paradoxical situation cannot come about where, except 
for the sovereign power, the member states have already assigned all 
their jurisdictions to the central organization. This bv the way wholly 
straightforward statement is of importance for us merely because in 
our opinion the commanding necessity for the integration of the sovereign 
power cannot emerge unless the sovereign power of the member States 
would become untenable, or vice versa, the central organs for want of the 
sovereign power would be unable to make use of their rights. Until, 
however, a situation of this kind would come about, until a substantial 
portion of human activity and cooperation would organize itself on the 
national plane, no objective demand for political integration would be 
forthcoming.
To all this, however, the objection may be raised that not even in 
federal States micro-economic and mac го-жоп o mic intertwining is a perfect 
one. Nor has the integration of the non-economic sectors taken place to 
the full extent, notwithstanding the fact that federations have unar­
guable been born as the outcome of political integration. Consequently in 
these formations the integrated central power and the non-integrated other 
fields are getting on well with each other.
This is the case beyond argument. In our opinion, however, the case 
is an altogether different one once there is talk of a State already in being, 
and so also when the talk is of a region actually in process of integration. 
In the case of federations namely the sequence was substantially always 
the reversed: first the political integration took place, to be followed by 
the economic integration. This statement will retain its validity even 
when in the majority of cases the two types of integration have developed 
in close interaction with each other. Namely at the decisive moment the 
political integration in all cases preceded the economic integration only 
to provide favourable conditions for the progress of the latter. It was then 
a matter of indifference for the integrated central power whether this 
intertwining would take place in all sectors without exception inasmuch
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as fundamentally the failure of complete integration to take place did 
not endanger the survival of integration itself.
All what this wants to express is that if the process had set in on the 
side of economy and not on that of power politics, the failure of the parti­
cular sectors to become integrated would, in conduction with other factors, 
be instrumental in the failure of the political integration and in the preser­
vation of the system of national States.
Another argument which may he brought forward against the thesis 
of the change-over of economic integration to political integration implies 
that by the side of the decision-making activity of the central agencies 
of the regional organization in the national States there survives the 
system of what are called preliminary decisions. The national State na­
mely has, on joining the organization of integration, merely waived its 
right to determine certain definite questions of economy autonomously 
in the future. I t  has merely agreed with the other member States hence­
forth to make joint decisions in these matters. It has by far not surren­
dered its right to form an opinion of its own in the given matters or to 
formulate its national interests and enforce them at the making of regio­
nal decisions. And here in each case, in all phases of preparation or dis­
cussion, there will be need for preliminary decisions, naturally in the 
practical sense rather than in the legal.To make these decisions theState will 
need an adequate amount of information. It will have to make its in­
quiries, become acquainted with the position taken by the economic insti­
tutions or interest groups active in its territory, and to draw up its 
economic-strategic plans, and so on. In reality therefore about the same 
process passes off in the national machinery of the State as before. There 
is but a single, though qualitative difference, namely that the making 
of the final decision is not anymore solely in the hands of the State in 
question: here the member States dispose in conjunction with one an­
other.
The situation is very much the same as far as enforcement is concer­
ned. This remains invariably within the jurisdiction of the national States. 
The supreme organ of the integration merely passes the necessary 
central decisions, still being void of a “local” administrative machinery it 
has to leave enforcement with the national executive organs to its full 
extent. Although e.g. the regulations of the Common Market are directly 
binding not only on the member States, but also on private persons, en­
forcement as a rule requires a series of further decisions. These decisions 
of enforcement are made by the national machineries, moreover to a 
large extent the supervision of the carrying into effect of the decisions 
comes also within their competence.
The survival of the system of preliminary decisions and of the 
decisions of enforcement implies that the policy of the administrative ma­
chineries of the member states will remain a fundamentally national one even 
in the f  uture, mainly for the following reasons:
— the national administration will remain to be staffed by the natio­
nals of the given State;
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— the principal officers of the national administration will receive 
their appointment from the supreme organs of the national State;
— in the course of enforcement these administrations will in most 
of the cases come into contact with national subjects (enterprises, 
banks); as has already been mentioned in production no international 
concerns will come into being;
— viewed from another aspect this stands for the straightforward 
fact that the national administrations can institute measures for the 
enforcement of decisions only in the territory of the national State;
— finally coercion will remain national coercion, there being no 
regional power-enforcement machinery to carry out the decisions.
In our opinion all that has been set forth constitutes a firm basis of 
the system of the national States and preserves this system to an extent 
that its disintegration as the result of the “spill over” effect appears to be 
unimaginable for the present moment. The survival of these bases, to­
gether with the revival of other factors such as nationalism, will bring 
about that the organization of political life will retain its substantially 
national character. If  we accept that the substance of this policy is implied 
in the struggle for the acquisition of the sovereign power and its mainte­
nance, or in the exercise of the sovereign power, then the statement may 
be made that in the present structure of integration the battle for the 
political power has to be waged on the national plane, and that this 
political power can in the first place be wielded on the national plane 
only. If namely regional economic-strategic decisions cannot be made 
unless with the agreement of the member states, and if the enforcement 
of these decisions takes place also on the national plane, power will have to 
be seized within the national state. All rival groups in the struggle for power 
are fully aware of this.
The question may, however, be asked, whether or not some sort of a 
specific new power has come into being within the (entrai administrations'1. 
Cannot international bureaucracy form some sort of a germ of the regional 
central power ?
To answer this question we have to set out from the definition of 
power Cs. Gombdr has formulated in Hungarian sociological literature.10 
Gombâr wants to discover the substance of power in the virtual possession 
of decision-making, i.e. he does not identify this e.g. with the exercise of 
influence or any other legally defined competence, etc. In his doctrine 
the “fu  nctional notion” of power is put together of the following elements:
— coercion (here the author has in mind not only concrete physical 
coercion, but in the wider sense the recourse to any means creating a case 
of necessity, hereincluded e.g. the promise of recourse to duress or the 
creation of a case of necessity);
— the redistribution of the material and immaterial goods (this may in a 
certain sense be reward and punishment, the latter, however, only if 
it cannot be integrated into the notion of coercion or duress);
— authority (which is substantially uniform with the growth of power 
to a state of legitimacy).
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In Gombar’s system the economic and intellectual potentials are 
merely underlying power and can never stand for power by themselves. 
“From the point of view of power economy is in all cases but a potentia­
lity,” he writes and then continues: “the by itself deaf, blind and dumb 
economic potential awakes to consciousness and begins to operate with 
all-social validity only in the sphere of politics.” In general the component 
elements referred to above do not occur one bv one: they are present 
jointly, although as indicated by the subject-matter under study, not 
in all cases. In our opinion the economic anil intellectual potentials ought 
to be supplemented by the category of the “military potential”, at least 
in international relations. I t is beyond doubt though that the latter is a 
function of the economic potential, still in reality a number of counter­
examples may turn up.17
The basis of power is accordingly,
— the military.
— the economic and
— the intellectual potentials.
This trichotomy may be misleading — one may think that these 
functional elements rely one by one only on each a basis element in the 
course of their operation. In reality, however, their interrelation is many- 
sided: each functional element may rely on any of the basis elements, or on 
all in conjunction.
l.et us now proceed to the study to what extent these elements and 
criteria may be discovered in the organizational system of the Western 
European integration.
As regards the Council of Ministers this body being composed of the 
representatives of the governments cannot as for its substance dispose of 
autonomous power. It is namely void of a military potential of its own, 
nor are the economic and intellectual potentials its own, these being held 
by the member States. This means that recourse to coercion cannot ob­
jectively be had by the Council, but separately by the member states. 
The decisions, too, can be enforced by the participants only in their res­
pective countries. The same holds for the redistribution of the goods. As 
regards the authority of the Council, this can be only a very relative 
one, partly lent by the member States. I t cannot be argued though that 
the Council is in the virtual possession of decision-making, however, only 
in so far as the member States pass their joint decisions by availing them­
selves of the institutional framework of the Council.
Substantially the agency representing the governments has not acqui­
red new powers. What is the situation with the independent machinery, 
the Commission ?
This organ has been vested with numerous independent executive 
and operative competences, in respect of which it is virtually in pos­
session of decision-making powers. Furthermore since the Commission, 
this independent machinery, initiates and prepares the joint decisions of 
the member States, it has a defining role in the decision making of the 
organization.
E C O N O M IC  IN T E G R A T IO N  A N D  P O L IT IC A L  IN T E G R A T IO N  2 2 3
What is therefore the situation of the Commission as regards the 
power relations ? Has some sort of a power of its own of this body come 
into being ? Obviously the use of coercion or the recognition of the possible 
recourse to coercion, is out of the question. The Commission like the Coun­
cil. cannot resort to coercion against the member States, since no powers 
of this kind have been vested in it. nor does it dispose of a power-enforcing 
machinery. The situation is, however, an altogether different one as 
regards the redistribution of goods. The independent organ disposes 
of substantial material and immaterial goods when (a) it makes 
decisions autonomously; (b) formally though the Council of Ministers is 
the decision-making authority, still in the process of initiation and pre­
paration the Commission has already defined the contents of the decision; 
(c) it takes part as “tenth party” directly in the formulation of the de­
cisions. in these cases therefore, solely or in conjunction with the member 
States, decision lays virtually with the bureaucratic machinery.
This is borne out by the formation of transnational capitalist con­
cerns referred to earlier mainly to influence the decisions of the Commis­
sion. The policy on this understanding is betrayed by the fact that the 
leading capitalist concerns recognize the special role of the Commission 
in decision-making as legitimate, i. e. the bureaucratic machinery has by 
this got hold of prestige.
Hence the Commision disposes of two of the three “functional” elements 
of power, viz. of the capacity for the redistribution of goods and authority. 
The statement may also lie made that a substantial part of the regional 
decisions come into being within this organization is virtually possessed 
by this organ.
What is the situation with the “basis elements” ?
Power has been conferred on the bureaucratic machinery not only 
by the member States. In fact much of this power has been lent by the 
transnational pressure groups. The majority of these groups namely 
possesses a substantial economic potential. On the other hand the eco­
nomic potential will, exactly through the groups in process of organiz­
ing on the political plane, transform into power, i. e. the groups acquire a 
certain dexterity in management and prestige by relying on the existing 
economic basis. Tn the present instance therefore the talk is of political 
communities where, too. some sort of power of their own tends to develop. 
These communities make use of this power to stand up against other 
groups and to gain a favourable position for themselves at the distribu­
tion of goods. This is not, however, their only function. The pressure 
groups in question have a significant role in extending their assistance 
to the bureaucratic machinery whenever there is talk of the enforcement 
of regional and collective capitalist interests and when these interests 
have already been appropriated by the machinery. At this juncture the 
statement may be made that the groups lend power to the Commission. 
In this case this organ may by relying on the power of their own of 
the groups vindicate its claims against the States. It may even occur, 
when the one group or the other has made futile attempts at influencing
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the attitude of the given State on the national plane, that it will try to 
make good its interests on a regional plane, through the Commission.
This does not of course mean as if the opinions of the pressure groups 
and the bureaucratic machinery were congruous in each case. The groups 
often come into conflict with the Commission, if the latter embarks on a 
policy departing from that of the groups. If. however, in this process the 
Commission has been worsted and approves of the opinion of the groups 
in question, in the ensuing process of decision-making it may reckon with 
their power and assistance.
On hand of what has been set forth the statement may be made that in 
a lucky case the bureaucratic machinery may sely on two of the three “basis 
elements" of power, viz. on the economic and the intellectual potentials. 
(In the European Economic Community the intellectual potential is 
provided by a staff of about seven thousand well-trained employees and in 
certain cases by a large number of experts and professionals.) Hence a 
relatively autonomous power of a certain degree has developed for use by 
the Commission. The autonomy is a relative one merely because of the 
organizational system as a whole, the member States continue to dispose: 
eventually the member States determine the direction of the further deve­
lopment of the integration through their representatives. The Commission 
may make use of the power of its own only within a definite scope and 
even this scope has been narrowed down by the political action of the 
member States, in the first place bv France, during the latter decade. 
The gist of the matter is that at the time of the birth of the EEC the 
member States agreed and are agreeing even today that the central machi­
nery has developed to a relatively autonomous power, merely because the 
members were in need for a specialized institution representing regional 
capitalist interests. It is out of the question, however, that this power should 
develop to the germ of a later regional central power. To this namely for want 
of the third, and the most important basis element viz. the voluntary 
surrender of power by the member States would be required. Automatic 
“self-development” is unimaginable.
What has been said cannot at the same time be construed so as to pre­
clude the organization from constituting a segregated power unit with 
respect to the rest of the world. The functional and basis elements here dis­
cussed may be exploited also in the international relations of the Com­
munity. Here, however, in the first place the economic-military-intellec­
tual basis of the member States has a part to act. By the side of this part 
the forces at the disposal of the bureaucratic machinery shrink to insigni­
ficance. Consequently the foreign political institutions so far created, or to 
be created, within the European Economic Community will transform 
the economic-military-intellectual potential of the member Stales to power, 
and not that of the Community. Therefore the special power of the organi­
zation cannot constitute the germ of some sort of a regional central power 
even in the field of foreign relations.
On continuing this analysis of the general interrelations of the 
economic and political integration we have to refute a hypothesis re-
15 ANNALES — Scclio luiidica — Toir.us XVIII.
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centi y gaining in currency. Bourgeois sociologist often venture the state­
ment that the “spill over” effect in reality operates “through the spirit". 
From this they conclude that the system of values of the actors coming 
into contact with the integration as the outcome of economic intertwin­
ing will tend to change gradually. Or as Haas states it, their expectations, 
loyalty and political-economic activity partly shifts to the new, regional 
centre.18 The actors further learn to solve any problems emerging in each 
case in conjunction with the member States of the region and even acquire 
the corresponding abilities demanded by the integration for closer coope­
ration. The changed system of values of the actors do not fail to hare an 
effect also on those active in fields not yet affected by the integration. Thus 
the system of values of the latter actors will also tend to change, and 
these actors will slowly bring forward claims to the integration of their 
own territories even before a material need presents itself. According to 
those professing this doctrine this would be the case also in the relations 
of the sphere of economics and politics. Those in possession of the political 
power would sooner or later feel the need for an intertwining of powers 
also in the international plane and as the outcome of their activities the 
economic integration would change over to a political integration.
What has been said on advancing the foregoing arguments in our 
opinion offers an answer also to this hypothesis. Namely when in the 
course of economic integration in statu nascendi the institutions of pre­
liminary decision and national enforcement can be salvaged, then the 
system of values of the actors cooperating in the integration will be modi­
fied partly and in a definite sense only. This partial modification will be 
inadequate to have an impact on the consciousness of those active in the 
sphere of politics and power in any decisive manner and so trigger off 
the “spill over” effect. The effect will be weakened furthermore bv the 
fact that integration does not pass off in all sectors of economy. Conse­
quently the system of values of some of the actors will not change at all. 
Therefore in all groups of the actors the system of values preserving the 
institution of the national State will more or less survive.
In this trend of thought the question may turn up, whether the con­
flict of interests of the States in process of integration would not call for the 
concentration of power in a single hand. Werner Kaltefleiter e. g. in this 
connexion makes the statement that “the bridging of the conflict of inte­
rests presupposes a superordinate, independent political power.” Accor­
ding to this author the central organ once become idependent should not 
be forced to have recourse to the power formations of the member States 
for the enforcement of their decisions. Therefore also power should be 
integrated, concludes Kaltefleiter.19
The author, however, goes too far when for the bridging of conflicts 
of interests he has in mind means of power only. His thesis would mean 
that in principle in international life not a single controversy could be 
settled, there being no “superordinate” power above the States. In our 
opinion by the side of the various international conventions and diplo­
matic channels in the first place exactly the organizations of integration
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are those which dispose of fairly developed institutions for the settlement 
of conflicts by a compromise or by mutual consent. Of course there are 
conflicts, and by far not a few only, which defy attempts at settlement by 
a compromise or by consent. The presumed advantages achieved while 
“bridging” these conflicts are eclipsed by the extraordinary drawbacks 
and hazards implied in an integration of power.
Another factor preserving the institution of the national State is the 
interest of the capitalist class exclusively in the creation of an organiza­
tion of integration within which it can take part at least indirectly in deci­
sion-making, or prevent decisions, perhaps reasonable for the all-capitalist 
interests of the given region, yet unreasonable from the point of view of 
national capital, from being passed. To this end the safest means is the 
institution of joint and concerted decision-making, when the last word is 
said by the representatives of the governments of the national States, and 
not by some sort of a supranational, independent organ. For this contin­
gency the law of unequal development may account, a law namely which 
has its roots exactly in the existence of national States, but which at the 
same time draws the capitalist class to the national State faithfully serving 
the special interests if this class.
Incidentally the national State peforms its function of the safeguard 
of interests not only at the decision-making of the integration, but at the 
same time it serves as “built-in” safety organization in the operation of the 
international machineries of the integration, whenever national capitalist 
interests of a sudden find themselves in a critical situation in the integrated 
market (see the legitimate cases of the institution of extraordinary mea­
sures for the safeguard of national economy). None of the national groups 
of capitalists participating in the integration can in the long run feel 
itself strong enough to deprive itself of the protection of its of own na­
tional State.
Finally our last argument relies on a noteworthy statement made by 
Heinz Wagner and at the same time casts a light on an alternative course 
of development. According to Wagner no cogent argument can be advan­
ced for entrusting the totality of problems solvable at the international 
level to a single organization. As a matter of fact there are problems which 
for a solution call for the integration, whereas there are others where 
cooperation would suffice. At the present state of differentiated develop­
ment of the world the various problems could be tackled best by interna­
tional organizations of different types and composition. Wagner by the 
side of the Common Market refers to OECD, GATT, NATO, the Council of 
Europe, the IMF, UNESCO, etc., which owe their lives substantially to 
this principle.20 This principle partly rests on the regularity of unequal 
capitalist development, partly it gives expression to certain geographical 
regularities and the segregation of certain functions. Obviously only 
countries as for their stage of development and social system are capable 
of bringing about a close economic integration. I t is impossible to integ­
rate all States of the world into a single unit, there being striking differen­
ces in development between them. Nor do all States belong to a uniform
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economic region. At the same time there are functions which would de­
mand the cooperation of all States irrespective of the social order or 
geographical situation, naturally in a form by far looser than an integ­
ration (e. g. in certain spheres of hygiene or international security).
In our opinion the differentiated development of the system of 
international organizations operates against the political integration. 
Here we agree to some extent with Uwe Kitzinger: “ For historical and 
technological reasons we have become used to a form of organization, 
where unrestricted jurisdiction existed in a geographically limited terri­
tory. . . . this organizational form may be called vertical. In the earlier 
peiiods of technological development, when culture developed restricted 
by linguistic rather than technological conditions, this was a fairly ade­
quate form of organization. Today, however, a further dimension, the 
horizontal, should be introduced as the pattern.” In contradistinction to 
the former a “limited jurisdiction in an unlimited geographical space" 
would be characteristic, or more accurately, “in a geographical space 
which is in agreement with the geography of a problem (function).”21 It 
should be noted, however, that this sparkling paradox is apt to give 
occasion to misunderstandings. The “limited jurisdiction” obviously refers 
to the several variants of international organizations. Yet it might refer 
also to the States, only exactly in their case in an invariably limited 
territory. We can therefore accept his formulation only in the sense that 
as for its substance the internal sovereign power of the national State 
would continue to live, although in an ever more restricted form, and as a 
matter of course only in the territory of the national State.
On this understanding the reality of the hypothesis formulated by 
the functionalists, or the partisans of the theory of “spill over” and also of 
others, appear to be open to doubts. In  the coming historical period the 
organization of the activities and cooperation of World society will in all 
likelihood pass off in a differentiated framework. Dependent on the 
nature of the task the participants of the organization will be States 
disposing of a central power enforcement system, further organizations 
of regional integration, or the traditional particular or universal inter­
national organizations.
Our contention is therfore that the economic integration taking place 
within the Community and the. institutionalized coordination of foreign 
political decisions in an ever expanding sphere will not change over automati­
cally to a political integration in the strict meaning of the term.
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WIRTSCHAFTLICHE INTEGRATION UND POLITISCHE INTEGRATION
( Z usam men fassung)
D er M einung des Verfassers gem äß kann cs in absehbarer Zeit n icht e rw a rte t werden 
daß der w irtschaftliche Integrationsprozeß in eine politische In teg ra tion , das heißt in 
irgendeine Föderationsentw icklung überschlägt. Die E n ts teh u n g  des nationalen  M arktes 
w ar zw ar seinerzeit m it der B ildung des nationalen  S taa tes eng verbunden , die G eschichte 
w iederholt sich aber n ich t unbedingt. Die M arkt- und  sp ä te r die w irtschaftlich-politische 
In teg ra tion  k an n  auch ohne M achtin tegration  verwirklicht werden. D as K ap ita l erfordert 
n ich t die A uflösung der S taa ten  in einer größeren E inheit, wenn es die Befriedigung 
seiner In teressen  in dem gegenw ärtigen — im G runde genom m en dezentralisierten  Sys­
tem  — auch w eiter gesichert sieht. Im  G egenteil, im In teresse der A ufrecht e rh a lt ung 
seiner K lassenherrschaft benö tig t es ausgesprochen den N a tiona ls taa t. Bis je tz t  ha t 
noch gar keine politische Macht gegen die O rganisierung der K lassenherrschaft im R ahm en 
des N ationalstaa tes eine H erausforderung gerichtet. Der K lassenkam pf vollzieht sich im 
jetzigen A bschnitt der gesellschaftlichen E n t wicklung in e rs te r Linie noch im m er inner­
halb  des N ationalstaates. Die m ark tw irtschaftliche In tegration  beansprucht aber in sich 
selbst keine m akropolitische In teg ra tio n : zwischen der W irtschaft und Politik besteh t 
kein so triv ia l kausaler Zusam m enhang.
Es kann angenom m en werden, daß die O rganisierung der T ätigkeit und Zusam m en­
arbeit der G esellschaft in der künftigen  geschichtlichen Periode au f  ad äq u a te r Weise m it 
dem  C harakter der Aufgaben zwischen differenziertem  R ahm en vor sich gehen wird. An 
diesem Prozeß werden sowohl die S taa ten  m it einem Zentralen A pparat und  die regionalen 
In tegrationsorganisationen als auch au f anderen Gebieten die trad itionellen  p artik u la ren  
und  universellen in ternationalen  O rganisationen teilnehm en.
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э к о н о м и ч е с к а я  и н т е г р а ц и я  и  п о л и т и ч е с к а я  и н т е г р а ц и я
(Резюме)
По мнению автора в ближайшем будущем не ожидается изменение экономи­
ческого интеграционного процесса в политическую интеграцию, т. е. в какое-то 
федерационное развитие. Хотя в свое время возникновение национального рынка 
было тесно связано с возникновением национального государства, история не 
повторяется безусловно.
Р ыночную а позже экономическую интеграцию можно осуществить и без 
интеграции власти. Капитал не требует объединения государств в большую еди­
ницу, если он считает обеспеченным и дальнейшее удовлетворение своих интересов 
в настоящей, по сути дела децентрализованной системе. Даже в интересах со­
хранения своего классового господства он непременно нуждается в национальном 
государстве. До сих пор никакая политическая сила не нападала на организацию 
классового господства в рамках национального государства. В настоящий период 
развития общества классовая борьба все еще происходит внутри национального 
государства. Макроэкономическая интеграция же сама по себе не требует макро­
политической интеграции: между экономией и политикой нет такой простой при­
чинной связи.
Можно предположить, что организация деятельности и сотрудничества об­
щества в последующий исторический период осуществится в рамках адекватно 
диференциальных по характеру задач. Государства, располагающие центральным 
аппаратом и региональные интеграционные организации таким же образом будут 
участвовать в этом процессе, как в других областях традиционно партикулярные и 
универсальные международные организации.
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